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Note
Native American Rape Victims: Desperately
Seeking an Oliphant-Fix
Marie Quasius∗
Leslie Ironroad lay dying in her hospital bed. She scribbled
a statement to a police officer and identified the men who raped
her, beat her, and locked her in the bathroom where she attempted to overdose on prescription medicine to escape further
harm.1 No charges were filed.2 Members of the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation indicate that the police never investigated
the men she identified.3 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) police officer who took her statement did not follow up on her case
because, in his words, “[federal prosecutors] only take the ones
with a confession.”4 Prosecutorial inaction forces the BIA police,
who at the time of Ironroad’s death had five officers for a territory the size of Connecticut,5 to triage the many calls they receive each week.6
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Kevin Washburn for guiding me to a compelling topic, to Joan Howland for her
helpful supervision and mentorship, and to all the University of Minnesota
reference librarians for all their help. Further thanks to my classmates on the
Minnesota Law Review, especially Jeff Justman, Jenni Vainik-Ives, Liz Borer,
Anna Richey-Allen, and Kyle Hawkins for their encouragement and enthusiasm. Finally, my beloved friends, family, and boyfriend deserve thanks for
their patience while I wrote and revised this Note. Copyright © 2009 by Marie
Quasius.
1. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvestigated
(National Public Radio broadcast July 25, 2007), available at http://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12203114.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. By 2008, the number had increased to ten, still far short of the level needed for minimally safe staffing. See Discussion Draft Legislation to Address Law and Order in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 13 (2008) (statement of Ron His Horse Is Thunder,
Chair of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe). Ten officers provide an actual staffing level of two officers on duty per 24-hour period. Id. During the summer of
2008, the BIA implemented Operation Dakota Peacekeeper, a temporary surge

1902

2009]

SEEKING AN OLIPHANT-FIX

1903

Rape of Native American7 and Alaska Native women8 occurs at a disproportionately high rate compared to women in
other racial and ethnic groups in the United States.9 Not only
are Native women more likely to be raped, they are more likely
to have injuries, and their injuries are often more severe.10 The
perpetrators overwhelmingly come from outside the Native
American community11 and their crimes generally go uninvesof twenty additional law-enforcement personnel to Standing Rock. Id. at 9
(statement of Sen. Thune). Following the surge, the BIA hoped to maintain an,
albeit still insufficient, total of seventeen officers in Standing Rock. See
Progress and Future of Operation Dakota Peacekeeper: Field Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 26 (2008) (statement of W. Patrick Ragsdale, Dir., Office of Justice Servs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior).
6. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1.
7. Consensus does not exist about terminology collectively to describe
tribes in the United States. CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF
THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 387 (Vintage Books 2006) (2005). For a
brief overview of the origins and problems of the terms “Indian” and “Native
American” see MANN, supra, at 387–92 (“Appendix A: Loaded Words”). Indian
is more commonly used in federal law—e.g. Title 25 of the United States Code
is entitled “Indians,”— while Native American appears in some scholarly
works. This Note uses the terms and their variants interchangeably and prefers Indian or American Indian when referring to federal law, and Native
American or Native in other contexts. I do not make legal or ethnological distinctions between the two terms for the purposes of this Note.
8. Men and women both experience rape and sexual assault, however,
this Note focuses on Native women because the overwhelming majority of sexual assaults are committed against women. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 24 (1997).
9. See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 2 (2007); Brenda
Norrell, Native Women Are Prey: Communities and Courts Fail Native Women,
NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Dec. 29, 2003, at 9, 9 (“One in three Native
American women will be raped in her lifetime.”).
10. See Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 456–
57 (2005) (noting that 90% of Native women report that their aggressors hit
them during the assault, compared to 74% of non-Native rape victims). Similarly, 50% of Native women reported injury, compared to 30% of the general
population. Id. at 457. Additionally, nearly three times more Native women
than non-Native women report that their aggressor used a weapon during the
rape. Id.
11. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS
AND CRIME 9 (2004) (“Nearly 4 in 5 American Indian victims of rape/sexual
assault described the offender as white.”); Deer, supra note 10, at 457 (citing
studies reporting that white perpetrators commit 70% of rapes involving Native women); see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 5 (reporting data from
Oklahoma and Alaska that suggest that approximately 58% of perpetrators
are non-Indian and noting the need for further quantitative study). Compare
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tigated and unprosecuted.12 Thus, even though Native American women are more likely to be sexually assaulted, their aggressors are less likely to be prosecuted. Jurisdictional issues
present the main barrier to prosecution and play a large role in
the disparity.13 The situation may worsen: some scholars suggest that the prevalence of such violent incidents may increase
as new gambling and tourism initiatives bring non-Indians into
closer contact with Native American women living on reservations.14
This Note focuses on the jurisdictional difficulties that prevent or limit the prosecution of sexual assault of Native women
by non-Indian aggressors. For a variety of institutional and social reasons, the appropriate federal or state authorities15 prosecute few perpetrators of rape of Native American women.16
For example, Department of Justice records show that federal
prosecutors filed only 606 criminal cases in 2006 for all of Indian country, which includes more than 560 federally recognized tribes.17 Similar reports exist for tribal governments in
Public Law 28018 states, where state prosecutors have criminal
jurisdiction but tribes find the response similarly inadequate.19
these figures to the fact that Native Americans comprise 70% of defendants
sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines for aggravated criminal
sexual abuse, statutory rape, and sexually abusive contact. See John V. Butcher, Federal Courts and the Native American Sex Offender, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 85, 85 (2000).
12. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Land Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27 (describing jurisdictional
difficulties in two reported rapes where the blindfolded victims could not identify whether or not the crime occurred on tribal land).
14. Cf., e.g., Jared B. Cawley, Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Go
Back on the Rez: Is It Safe?, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 413, 429 (2004 -05) (suggesting a likely increase in crime rates due to an influx of non-Indians onto reservations for gambling).
15. See Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 125–26 (2004).
16. See Norrell, supra note 9, at 9 (noting the total number of convictions
for forcible rape of Native women nationwide in 2003 (54) and the number of
rapes reported on a single South Dakota reservation in a single month (40)).
17. N. Bruce Duthu, Op-Ed., Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at A17.
18. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1162 (2006), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322 (2006), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000) (popularly known as Public Law 280)).
19. See Deer, supra note 15, at 126; Mending the Sacred Hoop, Jurisdictional Issues Complicate Response to Sexual Assault for Tribes Under PL280
Status, THE RESOURCE (Nat’l Sexual Violence Resource Ctr., Enola Pa.),

2009]

SEEKING AN OLIPHANT-FIX

1905

While tribal courts technically may prosecute the small
proportion of perpetrators who are Native American,20 the Indian Civil Rights Act21 (ICRA) limits punishment to one year of
imprisonment, a $5,000 fine, or both22—far less than the state
and federal penalties for the same crimes, which generally exceed eight and twelve years, respectively.23 Furthermore, even
if a tribe asserts jurisdiction, the lack of funding for tribal law
enforcement restricts investigation and prosecution.24 Some
tribes even curtail law enforcement activities related to crimes
of sexual violence because they believe that they lack the ability to arrest suspects.25
Federal statutes and case law set out an unduly complex
system wherein criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed
in Indian country depends on a number of factors: the type of
crime,26 where it occurred,27 and the tribal-membership status
Fall/Winter 2003, at 2, 12 (reporting consequences of jurisdictional confusion
in Public Law 280 states).
20. Deer, supra note 15, at 128 (noting that sexual-assault prosecutions in
tribal courts occur, but are rare).
21. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
23. Duthu, supra note 17. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1 & ch. 5, pt. A, at 396 (2008) (setting the base sentence range for
aggravated sexual assault at 151–188 months).
24. Deer, supra note 10, at 463 (“In addition to the multitude of legal barriers restricting tribal governments from taking action against sexual violence,
tribal nations are notoriously underresourced.”). Deer further notes, “There
are fewer law enforcement officers in Indian Country than in other rural areas
and significantly fewer per capita than nationwide.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in Indian country, per capita
spending on law enforcement is approximately 60% of the national average.
Id.
25. Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The
Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1275, 1284 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (popularly known as the Major Crimes
Act)). The Major Crimes Act distinguishes fifteen crimes as “major” and grants
jurisdiction to the federal government over “[a]ny Indian who commits against
the person or property of another Indian or other person.” Id. § 1153(a).
27. For example, Public Law 280 transferred criminal jurisdiction over
any person who commits a crime in designated areas of Indian country to state
governments in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162. But see id. § 1323 (allowing retrocession of jurisdiction to the federal government). Amendments to Public Law 280 also allow
other states to assume criminal jurisdiction but require tribal consent. See id.
§ 1321.
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of the victim and the perpetrator.28 Often, the ensuing confusion over jurisdictional issues suffices to deter investigation
and prosecution by any authority.29 Indeed, since the Supreme
Court decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe30 effectively stripped tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
tribal law enforcement officials and victim advocates have reported a substantial increase in the number of non-Indian criminals who exploit this gap in jurisdiction and commit crimes on
reservations.31 The failure to prosecute troubles Indian communities,32 but they lack the political power to oust unsatisfactory state or federal prosecutors.33 Ultimately, Native American
rape victims rarely receive justice.
This Note argues that tribes should exercise criminal jurisdiction over sex crimes involving Native American women
and that if an opt-in program34 existed, tribes with the capacity
to prosecute offenders could provide more effective and culturally relevant justice for rape survivors. Part I describes the
development of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and the
current legal obstacles that prevent the prosecution of Indians
and non-Indians for sexual assault of Native American women.
It also explores the potential of modern tribal governments to
undertake prosecutions. Part II outlines an opt-in program to
evaluate the ability of tribal governments to assume criminal
28. The Major Crimes Act extends federal jurisdiction only to crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country. Id. § 1153.
29. Ralph Blumenthal, For Indian Victims of Sexual Assault, a Tangled
Legal Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A16.
30. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
31. Deer, supra note 15, at 126; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27–28.
32. Avis Little Eagle, Rape Charge Dropped, Standing Rock Angry, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing the Standing Rock
Sioux community’s anger over the dismissal of a rape charge on statute-oflimitation grounds because the district attorney had “bungled” the case of a
Native woman who was raped, beaten, shot several times in the head and torso, and then chained to the back of a pickup truck and dumped in a river).
33. Most nonfederal prosecutors are elected by citizens of the state and
subject to numerous political checks. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians,
Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 728 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, American Indians]. In contrast, federal prosecutors are appointed by the
executive branch and are not accountable to tribal members for their decisions. Cf. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self–
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 846–47 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn,
Federal Criminal Law] (noting that, in other contexts, providers of services
who are directly accountable to a tribe provide improved delivery of services).
34. Generally, an opt-in program would give tribes the opportunity to undertake criminal jurisdiction, but would not mandate that they do so. See infra
Part II.C.
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jurisdiction over sexual assault and other major crimes and
then facilitate the assumption of jurisdiction. This approach
considers the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions. Finally, Part III argues that law and policy support giving tribes criminal jurisdiction as the best long-term solution
for Native American women, tribal sovereignty, and federal
and state governments. Ultimately, an opt-in program would
eliminate the jurisdictional gap for some Indian tribes and increase their ability to prosecute individuals who commit heinous crimes against Native American women.
I. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER SEXUAL ASSAULT IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Depending on the circumstances, prosecutors from the
state, federal, or tribal government might act against the perpetrator of a sexual assault, but often none do because of the
jurisdictional maze outlined below. This section details the current jurisdictional confusion, which impedes the prosecution of
sexual assaults perpetrated against Native American women,
and considers the ability of modern tribal courts to assume
greater jurisdiction.
A. THE FEDERAL (OR STATE) GOVERNMENT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER MOST CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Indian tribes are sovereign nations; a tribe retains its sovereign powers unless expressly relinquished by the tribe in a
treaty or taken from the tribe by a federal statute.35 Under the
terms of early treaties, tribes generally retained the right of
self-government, including “maintaining the relations of peace
and war, of being responsible in their political character for any
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed
on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community.”36 By the terms of many treaties, certain tribes
even retained the power to punish non-Indian individuals who
intruded on Indian lands and committed a crime.37 According to
35. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute,
or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”). But see Ex
parte Crow Dog, 119 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (requiring a clear expression of the
intention of Congress to abrogate tribal sovereignty).
36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
37. See, e.g., Treaty of Greeneville art. VI, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49, 52 (“If
any citizen of the United States, or any other white person or persons, shall
presume to settle upon the lands now relinquished by the United States, such
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some scholars, tribes retained this power in almost every treaty
the signed around the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.38 Nevertheless, Congress passed the General Crimes Act39
and the Major Crimes Act,40 which vested jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country in the federal government
instead of tribal governments.
The General Crimes Act grants criminal jurisdiction to the
federal government over crimes “by and against” Indians except
where: (1) an Indian committed a crime against another Indian
or on Indian land, (2) an Indian had already been punished according to the local law of the tribe, or (3) the treaty reserved
criminal jurisdiction to the tribe.41 The rationale for the exceptions was that there was no federal interest to justify an intrusion on tribal sovereignty.42
In spite of this, the Major Crimes Act obliterates these exceptions by providing the federal government with jurisdiction
over specific crimes, including sexual assault,43 committed by
citizen or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States; and
the Indian tribe, on whose land the settlement shall be made, may drive off
the settler, or punish him in such manner as they shall think fit.”).
38. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 123 n.22 (2002).
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383, 383 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)). The General Crimes Act expressly recognized existing
treaties: “[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as to affect any treaty now
in force between the United States and any Indian nation, or to extend to any
offence committed by one Indian against another, within any Indian boundary.” Id. § 2.
40. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1153). The Major Crimes Act granted full jurisdiction to the federal government over all Indians, whether an alleged crime occurred in Indian
country or not. Id.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The General Crimes Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished
by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Id.
42. See Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 793.
43. The “major crimes” originally covered by the Major Crimes Act included murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. at 385. But,
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Indians against other Indians in Indian country.44 If no federal
law exclusively governs the offense, then the federal court determines the choice of law by reference to law of the state within which the offense was committed.45
States lack jurisdiction over crimes committed by or
against Indians in Indian country unless federal legislation expressly grants authority.46 Although the Supreme Court characterized states as the “deadliest enemies” of tribes,47 Congress transferred criminal jurisdiction to several states through
Public Law 280 in an attempt to fill a gap in jurisdiction over
crimes committed on reservations.48 But, Congress did not solicit the consent of the tribes or the states and failed to provide
funding for the state governments to fulfill their additional responsibilities.49 Thus, although one motivation for Congress to
enact Public Law 280 was to fix the jurisdictional gap on many
reservations, it actually increased the gap by allocating prosecutorial responsibility to state governments that lacked the resources to prosecute.50 Ultimately, Congress transferred crimivarious amendments (including nearly an entire chapter of the federal criminal code) make it “something of a fool’s errand to attempt to count the number
of offenses enumerated by the Major Crimes Act.” Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 826.
44. The Act states: “Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely . . . a felony under chapter 109A . . . shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Chapter 109A
of Title 18 of the United States Code concerns sexual abuse. See id. §§ 2241–
2248.
45. Id. § 1153(b).
46. CAROLE GOLDBERG & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAW 280 AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY—
RESEARCH PRIORITIES 1 (2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209839.pdf.
47. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Tribes] owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies.”).
48. See S. REP. NO. 83-699, at 5 (1953) (“In many States, tribes are not
adequately organized to perform that function [law enforcement]; consequently, there has been created a hiatus . . . that could be remedied by conferring
criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness to accept
such responsibility.”); see also Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits
of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 540–44
(1975) (reviewing the legislative history of Public Law 280).
49. Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal,
State, and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 1023 (2000).
50. Cf. id.
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nal jurisdiction to federal and state law enforcement without
securing the actual provision of law enforcement and justice.
B. TRIBES DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES
COMMITTED IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY NON-INDIANS
The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe51 effectively precludes tribal prosecution of
non-Indians who sexually assault Native American women.52
The Oliphant case arose from the separate arrests of two nonIndian men on the Port Madison Reservation.53 The Suquamish
Tribe had prominently posted notices at entrances to the reservation to alert all visitors that their entry indicated consent to
the criminal jurisdiction of tribal court.54 Tribal police officers
arrested Mark Oliphant and charged him with assaulting a tribal police officer and resisting arrest.55 A second defendant,
Daniel Belgarde, was arrested and charged with recklessly endangering another person and injuring tribal property.56 After
conviction in the tribal court, the two defendants sought a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court,57 and ultimately the
Supreme Court,58 to determine whether the tribe appropriately
exercised criminal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendants.59
1. The Oliphant Court Held That Tribes Lack Criminal
Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Criminal Conduct Committed on
the Reservation
The Supreme Court held that tribes do not have inherent
jurisdiction to try or to punish non-Indians60 for two reasons.
First, the Court reasoned that tribal courts lack criminal juris51. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
52. Some scholars contend that tribes retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction. See Deer, supra note 15, at 127. But, the limitations that ICRA places on
a tribe’s ability to punish offenders make it unlikely that tribes retain jurisdiction over felonies. See Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at
817.
53. 435 U.S. at 194.
54. See id. at 193 n.2.
55. Id. at 194.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 431 U.S. 964 (1977) (mem.)
(granting certiorari).
59. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
60. Id. at 212.
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diction unless “explicitly provided by treaty or statute.”61 Further, the Court found implicit divestment of tribal criminal jurisdiction through an “unspoken presumption” among Congress, the executive branch, and the lower federal courts that
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.62 Applying
its reasoning to the Suquamish Tribe, the Court analyzed, inter
alia, the Suquamish Tribe’s treaty and found that the treaty’s
silence on the issue of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
supported its finding of implicit divestment.63
Second, the Court reasoned that because criminal justice
implicates the deprivation of life and liberty, “citizens [should]
be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty.”64 On the Suquamish reservation,
non-Indians could not participate in the political process of the
tribal government: non-Indians, for example, could not serve on
the juries of tribal courts.65 Furthermore, tribal constitutions
do not necessarily draw strict boundaries between separation of
powers; tribal courts may be subordinate to the legislative or
executive branches of tribal governments. Subordination could
theoretically interfere with the ability of the judges to render
impartial judgments.66 Lastly, tribal governments do not provide all of the protections of the Bill of Rights to defendants,
and the Court could not justify subjecting U.S. citizens to a
judicial system providing lesser protection to defendants.67

61. Id. at 191.
62. See id. at 203.
63. Id. at 214 –15.
64. Id. at 210. The Court applied the same reasoning used to preserve tribal autonomy in Crow Dog to diminish tribal autonomy in Oliphant. Compare
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (stating that Indians should not
be subjected to alien federal courts because such courts tried Indians “not by
their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but
by . . . a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have
an imperfect conception”), with Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211 (“These considerations [those listed in Crow Dog, supra], applied here to the non-Indian rather
than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against the validity of respondents’ contention that Indian tribes . . . retain the power to try non-Indians
according to their own customs and procedure.”).
65. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
66. See Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to
Achieve Good Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 207, 215 (2007).
67. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
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2. The Oliphant Court Relied on Inconclusive Evidence to
Determine Tribal Jurisdiction
The Oliphant Court relied on several documents to support
its conclusion that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian defendants. First, the Court noted that the tribe
was relying on a theory of retained inherent powers rather
than language in a treaty or congressional grants of authority.68 After quickly dismissing the possibility of historical support for jurisdiction,69 the Court quoted the 1830 treaty with
the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which guaranteed “the jurisdiction
and government of all the persons and property that may be
within their limits”70 The Court noted that a later provision in
the treaty stated that the Choctaws “express a wish that Congress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by their
own laws any white man who shall come into their nation, and
infringe any of their national regulations.”71 The Court held
that the provision constituted a request for affirmative congressional authority, which it found inconsistent with the notion that the inherent sovereignty of tribes justifies the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.72 The Court found
further support in two Attorneys General opinions from the
mid-1800s that concluded that “the Choctaws did not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent congressional authority.”73
The Court next analyzed Ex parte Kenyon,74 an 1878 district-court opinion from Arkansas in which the court granted a
non-Indian defendant’s writ of habeas corpus, and held that the
Cherokee tribal court lacked jurisdiction.75 Although the Kenyon court noted in dictum that to give an Indian tribal court
“jurisdiction of the person of an offender, such offender must be
68. Id. at 195–96.
69. The Court quoted an 1834 report by the Commissioners of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of War which stated, “the Indian tribes are without
laws,” see id. at 197 (quoting H.R. REP. 23-474 at 90 (1834)), as evidence that
tribes historically lacked the ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.
See id. The Court then used the Choctaw tribe as an example one of the tribes
that had what the Court described as a “sophisticated legal structure” in the
1830s. Id.
70. Id. at 197 (quoting the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, art. IV, Sept.
27, 1830, 4 Stat. 333, 333).
71. Id. (quoting art. IV, 4 Stat. at 334) (second emphasis added).
72. Id. at 197–98.
73. Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
74. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
75. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200.
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an Indian,” it ultimately held that the Cherokee court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant left the reservation and established a new domicile in Kansas.76 Furthermore, the Kenyon court stated that it respected tribal sovereignty and recognized the need to uphold such jurisdiction,
“because peace and good order demand that the courts of that
country, as well as this court, should possess the full measure
of their jurisdiction”77—so long as tribes exercise such jurisdiction constitutionally.78 The Oliphant Court relied on the Kenyon holding and a 1970 Department of the Interior opinion affirming Kenyon, observing only in a footnote that the
Department of the Interior opinion was inexplicably withdrawn
in 1974 and had not been replaced.79
Next, the Court examined the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790,80 in which Congress granted federal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against Indians which “would be punishable by the laws of [the] state or district . . . if the offense had
been committed against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof.”81
Although the Court noted that the original purpose of the General Crimes Act was to protect Indians from “the violences [sic]
of the lawless part of our frontier inhabitants,” it ultimately
found that Congress did not consider the problem of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians at the time because most tribes
lacked formal tribal judicial systems.82
In contrast, the Court found that Congress did address the
issue in 1834 when it tried to create an Indian territory to be
governed by a confederation of Indian tribes, which it ultimately expected to become a state.83 Although the bill failed to pass
76. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. at 355 (“When the members of a tribe of
Indians scatter themselves among the citizens of the United States, and live
among the people of the United States, they are merged in the mass of our
people, owing complete allegiance to the government of the United States and
of the state where they may reside, and, equally with the citizens of the United States and of the several states, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts thereof.”).
77. Id. at 354.
78. A court must have “jurisdiction over the person, the act, and the place
where it was committed” in order to exert jurisdiction over a criminal act within the limits of the Constitution. Id.
79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 n.11.
80. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
81. Id. at 201 (quoting Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. at 138) (alteration in original).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 201–02.
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(despite multiple proposals),84 the Oliphant Court found that
“Congress was careful not to give the tribes of the territory
criminal jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens
traveling through the area.”85 Still, a House of Representatives
report that accompanied the bill described federal criminal jurisdiction as necessary “for some time” to protect residents both
on and off the reservation in the absence of “competent tribunals of justice.”86
The Court also looked to amendments of the General
Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act to support the “unspoken
assumption” that the federal government retained some criminal jurisdiction over Indians.87 Congress amended the General
Crimes Act in 1854 to prohibit the federal courts from prosecuting an Indian who had already been tried in tribal court,88 and
created the Major Crimes Act in order to place Indian defendants who committed certain “major” crimes under federal jurisdiction.89 After examining the General Crimes Act, the Court
inferred that if tribal courts had jurisdiction over non-Indians,
there would have been a parallel provision prohibiting the retrial of non-Indians as well.90 With regard to the Major Crimes
Act, the Court argued that acknowledging tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians could create an anomalous situation where
tribal courts, if they did indeed possess concurrent jurisdiction
over major crimes, could prosecute non-Indians for major
crimes that the tribe could not prosecute if committed by a
member of the tribe.91
The Oliphant Court quoted a 1960 Senate report recommending the passage of a proposed statute that prohibited
trespass onto Indian land for the purpose of hunting and fish84. Id. at 202 n.13.
85. Id. at 202. The Court observed that the exception for “non-Indians
who settled without Government business in Indian territory” probably had
the purpose of discouraging settlement on land reserved exclusively for tribes.
Id. at 202 n.13.
86. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 18 (1834).
87. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
88. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).
89. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 342, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1153).
90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
91. Id. The Court reserved the question of whether the Major Crimes Act
created exclusive federal jurisdiction, id. at 203 n.14, but nonetheless assumed
in its analysis that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at
203.
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ing.92 The Court focused on the committee members’ statements—that tribes can enforce tribal law “against Indians only;
not against non-Indians” and that “non-Indians are not subject
to the jurisdiction of Indian courts”93—to confirm its assumption that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians. The
Court ignored the report’s express purpose to advocate for
equal protection of Indian property interests as a counterpart
to existing federal trespass laws.94
In sum, although the Court recognized that its evidence of
a historical shared presumption among Congress, the executive
branch and the lower courts was “not conclusive,”95 it nevertheless found that tribal courts as a whole do not have the power
to try non-Indians.96 On the basis of dictum in one district court
case, two Attorneys General opinions from the mid-nineteenth
century, a 1960 statement by a Senate committee, and a 1970
Interior Solicitor’s opinion that was subsequently revoked, the
Supreme Court nearly eliminated the power of tribal governments to obtain justice for Native American rape victims.
C. TRIBES DO HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES
COMMITTED BY NONMEMBER INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In Duro v. Reina,97 the Court considered whether a tribe
could prosecute a nonmember Indian defendant.98 Albert Duro
was a member of the Torrez-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians living on the Salt River Indian Reservation, where he
killed a fourteen-year-old boy from the Gila River Indian Reservation.99
After concluding that neither historical evidence nor
precedent provided a clear-cut answer, the Court analyzed Duro’s case according to the Oliphant theory of implied divest92. Id. at 204 –06 (quoting S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2–3 (1960)).
93. Id. at 205 (citing S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2).
94. See S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2–3.
95. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
96. Id. at 212.
97. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)).
Congress amended Public Law 101-511 to make the reinstatement of tribal
authority over all Indians permanent in 1991. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-137, 105 Stat. 646.
98. Generally, tribes determine membership requirements. L. Scott
Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 60 n.23 (1994).
99. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
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ment,100 opining that tribes surrendered sovereignty and jurisdiction over nonmember Indians as well when they entered into
a relationship with the United States for protection.101 The
Court also relied on the reasoning in Oliphant when it compared the political status of nonmember and non-Indians with
respect to the tribal government.102 Similar to non-Indians,
nonmember Indians cannot participate in the political
processes of the tribe—they cannot become members,103 vote,
hold office or serve on the juries of some tribal courts.104 Thus,
the Court concluded that tribal governments lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.105
While the Court held that tribal governments do not have
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,106 the ultimate effect, as
quickly recognized by Congress, was that no government had
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who committed crimes on
another reservation.107 Thus, Congress responded with the
“Duro-fix,”108 which amended ICRA to acknowledge expressly
100. The implied divestment argument in Oliphant rests on an “unspoken
assumption” among Congress, the executive branch, and the lower federal
courts that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because it had
been withdrawn by implication as a necessary result of tribes’ dependent status. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
101. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 326 (1978) (discussing the Court’s implied divestment reasoning).
102. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
103. Duro was not eligible for membership in the Salt River PimaMaricopa Indian Community. Id. at 679.
104. Id. at 688.
105. Id. at 679.
106. Id. at 696 (“[N]onmembers, who share relevant jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians, should share the same jurisdictional status.”).
107. See Gould, supra note 98, at 71 n.84. Currently, federal statutes generally limit jurisdiction over misdemeanors among Indians to tribes; the federal government generally has jurisdiction over felonies committed among Indians. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (granting jurisdiction over specific crimes
committed in Indian country to the federal government); Sarah Krakoff, A
Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent
Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1186–87 (2004) (explaining the allocation of jurisdiction among the Navajo Nation and state and federal governments over
various crimes). Further, it would not be feasible for the more than 300 tribes
recognized by the federal government to enter into reciprocal jurisdictional
agreements to prosecute nonmember Indians. Gould, supra note 98, at 77.
108. See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)). The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Duro-fix in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), holding that Congress had reinvested tribal courts with criminal jurisdiction over
all members of federally recognized tribes. Id. at 207.
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that tribes have inherent authority over “all Indians,”109 even
though a federal appeals court acknowledged that “[t]he exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is
virtually without historical precedent.”110
D. MODERN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS CAN AND DO EXERCISE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Although tribes have retained and regained authority in
many contexts,111 tribal court jurisdiction over criminal conduct
committed on the reservation remains extremely circumscribed, as described above.112 This section will describe the jurisdiction exercised by tribal courts, both historically and in
modern times, with a focus on criminal jurisdiction.
Historically, a substantial majority of cases in tribal courts
involved criminal matters,113 and at the time of Oliphant, many
tribes exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.114 Several government initiatives helped foster the ability of tribes to
exercise such jurisdiction. The Indian Reorganization Act115
(IRA), enacted by Congress in 1934, acknowledged that tribal
courts could apply tribal law (within the limits of the uniform
Bureau of Indian Affairs constitution).116 Further, the Tribal
Self-Governance Program helps tribes assume a variety of responsibilities, including law enforcement, by providing compacts and single- and multi-year funding agreements.117 With
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (emphasis added).
110. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded by 851
F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
111. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 687 (noting that tribal courts resolve civil
disputes involving nonmembers, even non-Indians).
112. See supra Part I.A–B.
113. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
114. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978)
(noting that of 127 reservation court systems that claim criminal jurisdiction,
45 extend or permit extension of their jurisdiction to non-Indians).
115. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006).
116. See William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on
the Path to Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 572–73
(2000) (discussing the “impos[ition]” of an “Anglo-European adversarial system” through the IRA).
117. See OFFICE OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, 2007 TRIBAL LISTINGS BY
AREA 3–5 (2007), http://www.ihs.gov/NonMedicalPrograms/SelfGovernance/
documents/07%20Tribal%20Listing.pdf (providing a list of tribes participating
in the tribal self-governance program and information on the specific compacts
and funding agreements).
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regard to sexual violence, many tribes have sophisticated criminal codes and resources available to help victims cope with
abuse.118 Given the foundation of the court system established
by the IRA and recent funding efforts directed at strengthening
tribal sovereignty,119 at least some tribal legal systems would
be ready to assume more extensive criminal jurisdiction if given the opportunity.
Tribal governments vary widely in how they structure
their judicial systems and how they adjudicate conflicts.120 For
example, some tribes have oral laws,121 while others have written laws,122 and tribes differ in the extent to which they are
subject to direct federal authority.123 For some traditional governments, the method of governance has not changed since the
colonization of the American continent, and the governmental
structure and procedure are unwritten and passed down orally.124 Other tribal governments have made a deliberate effort to
transform their government (without any input from the federal government) and have a written form of government without
being subject to the federal government’s approval in the exercise of their powers.125 Other governments were established
pursuant to laws such as the IRA.126 Under this Act, actions of
the tribal government are subject to the federal government’s
direct authority, and the enforcement of any laws passed by the
tribal council are subject to the approval of the United
States.127 In spite of the IRA, not all tribal governments have
118. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1276, 1303–04.
119. See generally Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3651–3681) (providing financial support and resources for tribal justice systems). Congress promised to provide $50 million per year for fiscal years 2000
to 2007 for tribal court systems under the Act). Tribal justice systems have not
received full funding. Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 11,
14 (2008) (statement of Hon. Roman J. Duran, First Vice-President, Nat’l
American Indian Court Judges Assn.).
120. See generally Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty
Through Government Reform: What Are the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
72 (1997) (analyzing the current state of tribal governance and providing suggestions for its reform).
121. Id. at 74 –75.
122. Id. at 75.
123. See id. at 74 –76.
124. See id. at 74 –75.
125. See id. at 75.
126. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006).
127. Porter, supra note 120, at 76.
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followed these paths. For example, the Navajo Nation has no
constitution but works within a well-developed legal tradition
of written government.128
Anglo-American courts differ from tribal courts in that the
Anglo-American system focuses on individual rights in an adversarial system and resolves criminal disputes through punishment and removal of the offender from the community.129
In contrast, many traditional Native American legal systems
emphasize restoration of the offender and his or her reintegration into the community130 through non-adversarial strategies
known as tribal peacemaking (TPM).131 The strategy operates
through the use of behavior-altering mechanisms such as anger, shame, embarrassment, and encouragement132 in the context of an oral ceremony where the victim, the accused, and
family members sit in a circle.133 Although some tribes have
been extremely successful at reducing crime rates through
TPM,134 tribes generally do not use TPM in adjudications involving non-Indian or nonmember defendants,135 and commentators question the effectiveness of TPM in the context of domestic violence.136
Tribal judicial systems, however, increasingly incorporate
aspects of the Anglo-American system.137 For example, many
tribes now provide independent judicial review, appellate review, and ethical guidelines for practitioners.138 Further, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure influence some tribal judges in

128. Id.
129. Bradford, supra note 116, at 566.
130. Id. at 565.
131. See id. at 577–79.
132. Id. at 580.
133. Id. at 581.
134. For example, the Tlingit found that five years after implementing
TPM, crime decreased by 35%. Id. at 590. However, certain offenders challenge the use of TPM in the modern world. See id. at 589–99 (recounting a
well-publicized case where the offenders flouted the TPM agreements).
135. Id. at 579–80.
136. See, e.g., Rashmi Goel, No Woman at the Center: The Use of the Canadian Sentencing Circle in Domestic Violence Cases, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 293,
321–28 (2000) (discussing the use and feasibility of TPM in the context of domestic violence and female victims).
137. O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5.
138. See id.
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the courtroom.139 Even where tribal judges sometimes follow
alternative procedures to adapt to local needs, they have found
that outside legal counsel have no difficulties in submitting to
different procedural rules.140 Some tribes, such as the Navajo,
apply substantive laws in the courtroom as well—with the express caveat that tribal laws do not apply where they violate
United States laws.141 Further, tribal courts often use processes
similar to those used by state and federal courts in developing
tribal common law.142 Although ICRA diverges from the Bill of
Rights in the extent to which it protects individual defendants,
some argue that tribes did not need ICRA because tribal legal
systems already had traditions of fairness and justice equivalent to those it imposed.143
E. TRIBES EXERCISE EXPANDED CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER
CERTAIN SUBJECT MATTER
Since 1970, federal Indian policy has focused on selfdetermination and renewing tribal self-governance in a variety
of contexts. Self-determination policy recognizes the inherent
sovereignty of tribes144 and promises tribes that the federal
government will work with tribes on a government-togovernment basis.145 This section will briefly describe two programs—one under the Clean Water Act146 and one under the
139. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law:
The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287,
325 (1998).
140. Id.
141. For example, a provision of the Navajo Nation Code directs tribal
courts to apply “any laws of the United States that may be applicable and any
laws or customs of the Navajo Nation not prohibited by applicable federal
laws.” NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 204(a) (1995).
142. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 139, at 328 (noting that most
tribal courts have some, but not all, of the features necessary for the AngloAmerican common-law process).
143. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 116, at 574 (explaining that tribes already operated under “[a]ncient and sacred tribal traditions of fairness and
justice”).
144. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n
(2006)) (authorizing the federal government to provide funding to recognized
tribes for the purposes of furthering the welfare of the tribes while maintaining their sovereignty).
145. See Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) (instructing federal
agencies to work with tribes on a “government-to-government” basis).
146. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1377 (2000).
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Indian Child Welfare Act147 (ICWA)—where the federal government has transferred jurisdiction over a particular subject
matter to tribal governments. The structure of these two initiatives will provide background for the proposal of an opt-in program of tribal criminal jurisdiction described in Part II.
Both ICWA and the Clean Water Act enable tribes to assume additional responsibility in a specific subject area. Congress enacted ICWA to counteract the disproportionate removal
and inhumane treatment of Native American children by state
and local agencies, and its provisions strongly favor tribal selfdetermination with regard to custody of Native American children.148 For example, the Act permits tribes to petition for “reassumption of jurisdiction” over child custody cases being heard
in state courts.149 Similar to the criminal justice system, the
American system of adoption disproportionately affects the Native American community and differs from the way the community would have dealt with adoptions before interference by
courts.150
Likewise, the Clean Water Act (and other environmental
statutes) provides for the “Treatment as State” (TAS) program,
under which tribes can promulgate and enforce water quality
standards that are stricter than federal standards, so long as
they follow a certain process and receive EPA approval.151 Initially passed to fill in the regulatory gaps of federal environmental law, the TAS program relied on established tribal governments, fixed territories, and longstanding commitments to
protection of the environment.152 Indeed, lawsuits filed against
tribes demonstrate real differences between tribes and states in

147. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006).
148. See Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska:
Fifteen Years, a Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 662–63
(1994) (noting the significance of the Act for its “implicit repudiation of the
guardian-ward relationship that the United States had compelled upon native
tribal peoples”).
149. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction . . . may reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.”).
150. Brooks, supra note 148, at 665 (“In devising a system of child placement and adoption designed to distance the child from his or her biological
family, American jurisprudence has created a system of child-rearing that is
foreign to the American Indian population, upon which the process is used
disproportionately frequently.”).
151. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
152. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The
Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 818 (2004).
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the enforcement of federal environmental laws in terms of
perspective, commitment, and legal posture.153
Regulations promulgated under ICWA describe the process
that tribes must go through to reassume exclusive jurisdiction
for a particular subject area.154 The application requires the
tribe, inter alia, to describe its tribal court system, provide copies of tribal rules and procedures for the exercise of jurisdiction
over the subject area, and cite provisions of the tribal constitution that allow tribal jurisdiction over the subject matter.155
The Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs reviews each application and approves it if it meets certain requirements.156 The petition must show that the tribal constitution authorizes such
jurisdiction and that the tribe has a procedure for clearly identifying persons who will be subject to the tribe’s jurisdiction.157
The Assistant Secretary must also determine that a tribe appears able to exercise jurisdiction over Indian child custody
matters in a manner consistent with due process and the other
safeguards embodied in ICRA and that the tribe has shown
that sufficient child care services are available for children who
are removed from their homes.158 The Assistant Secretary publishes a notice of approved petitions in the Federal Register
that clearly defines the territory subject to the re-assumption of
jurisdiction, and sends a copy to the tribe and the attorney general, governor and highest court of the state(s) affected by the
change in jurisdiction.159 If the Assistant Secretary does not
approve the petition, then the Bureau of Indian Affairs must
notify the tribe of its reasons for not approving the petition, offer technical assistance to remedy the defects and allow the
tribe to re-petition after correcting the defects in the original
plan.160
153. See id. at 820–23 (discussing three lawsuits filed against tribes for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act and the interests of states and tribes
in these cases).
154. See Allison M. Dussias, Note, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Civil
Disputes Involving Non-Indians: An Assessment of National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribes of Indians and a Proposal for Reform, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 239–40 (1986) (describing the process for reassumption of jurisdiction); see also Tribal Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Child
Custody Proceedings, 25 C.F.R. § 13 (2008).
155. 25 C.F.R. § 13.11(a).
156. Id. § 13.12(a).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 13.14(a)–(b).
160. Id. § 13.14(c)–(d).
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Similarly, the Clean Water Act allows tribes to apply to the
Environmental Protection Agency for TAS status.161 As a threshold matter, the tribe must prove that it constitutes a governing body that carries out “substantial governmental duties and
powers.”162 Second, the tribe must show that the functions that
it seeks to regulate pertain to the management and protection
of water resources.163 Last, the tribe must be “reasonably capable,” in the Administrator’s judgment, of carrying out the functions in a manner consistent with the statute and all relevant
regulations.164 Once a tribe receives TAS status, then it follows
the same regulations as a state in promulgating its standards.165 In what may be the only challenge to a particular
standard, the Tenth Circuit in City of Albuquerque v. Browner166 affirmed the Isleta Pueblo Indians’ enforcement of a more
stringent tribal water-quality standard on the effluent of an
upstream wastewater plant and accepted the argument that
the tribe’s ceremonial use of the river supported the need for a
more stringent water-quality standard.167 Tribes, once given jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, have promulgated and
enforced standards relevant to the special needs of their members. Part II of this Note will propose an opt-in program that
would allow tribes to implement more stringent sexual-assault
laws and impose greater penalties.
F. THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE IMPEDES EFFECTIVE
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION.
Despite the success of tribal governments with assuming
jurisdiction over water quality and adoption, the jurisdictional
maze prevents successful prosecution. The effect of Oliphant
and its progeny is two-fold. First, tribes cannot prosecute nonIndians who rape Native American women in Indian country.
Thus, if a non-Indian sexually assaults a Native American person, then federal courts (or state courts, in Public Law 280
states)168 have exclusive jurisdiction.169 If a non-Indian rapes a
161. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2008) (“Requirements for Indian Tribes to administer a water quality standards program.”).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1).
163. Id. § 1377(e)(2).
164. Id. § 1377(e)(3).
165. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(c).
166. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
167. Id. at 428–29.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (granting several states criminal jurisdic-
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non-Indian in Indian country, then the court of the state in
which the reservation is located has jurisdiction over the crime,
even though it occurred on Indian land.170 Given that a significant number of offenders are non-Indians,171 tribes must rely
on federal and state prosecutors to obtain justice for most
rapes.
Tribes, in contrast, can prosecute only Native Americans
who commit crimes that do not constitute major crimes as defined by the Major Crimes Act,172 and can punish the perpetrators only to the extent permitted by ICRA.173 Therefore, if an
Indian sexually assaults another Indian, then federal courts
have jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act,174 and tribal
courts may have concurrent—but extremely limited—
jurisdiction to impose lesser penalties.175 Although many tribes
with large numbers of nonmember Indians have found limited
misdemeanor jurisdiction to be essential to self-governance,176
tribal penalties cannot successfully deter sexual assault when
the federal government fails to prosecute felony assaults.
II. AN “OPT-IN” PROGRAM FOR TRIBES TO ASSUME
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION
Tribal jurisdiction represents the most effective and the
most appropriate option for prosecution of sexual assaults. An
opt-in program would provide a gradual transition to full tribal
tion over certain Indian countries located within their state to the same extent
as permitted, under state law, for non-Indian country territory).
169. Id.; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES
145–58 (Stephen L. Pevar ed., 2002).
170. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) (holding that
state courts may have jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.
621, 624 (1882) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over crimes committed by a non-Indian against another non-Indian within a reservation).
171. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 5.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (transferring jurisdiction over certain crimes to federal authorities).
173. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006) (limiting tribal governments to imposing a punishment of imprisonment longer than one year and/or a fine greater
than $5,000).
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (granting jurisdiction to the federal government over sexual-abuse crimes).
175. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169, at 148–49.
176. See Gould, supra note 98, at 72 n.84 (discussing the presence of a jurisdictional “void” if tribes are not allowed to prosecute misdemeanors); cf. 18
U.S.C. § 1302(7).
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jurisdiction over sexual assault and other criminal matters and
would assuage any concerns that non-Indian defendants will
not receive due process. As described above, existing programs
under ICWA and the Clean Water Act provide a model for a
program to allow some tribes to undertake criminal jurisdiction. Ultimately, as Part III asserts, both law and policy support the implementation of an opt-in program as highly beneficial to victims.
A. CONGRESS’S ROLE IN CREATING AN OPT-IN PROGRAM
This Note proposes the creation of an opt-in program that
allows tribes to assume criminal jurisdiction over acts committed on the reservation. Accomplishing this goal requires a
number of steps. First, ICRA must be amended, as it was for
the Duro-fix,177 to include “all persons.”178 This would enable
tribes to extend their criminal jurisdiction to include nonIndians. Second, Congress must amend the Major Crimes Act
so that it explicitly allows concurrent tribal jurisdiction over
sexual assault. Thus, tribes that gain entry into the opt-in program would have the freedom to prosecute, but Native American women from nonparticipating tribes would still receive the
protection of the federal government. Third, Congress would
have to amend ICRA to allow approved tribal governments to
impose punishments appropriate to the crime being prosecuted.
In addition, Congress must provide resources for the BIA to
administer the opt-in program. This would cover the payment
of public defenders in tribal courts and funding for the BIA to
help qualified tribes assume criminal jurisdiction and make arrangements for long-term incarceration. Finally, Congress
would need to provide for appellate review, whether in the federal courts or in a specialized appellate court.
Congress has the authority to reinvest tribal sovereignty
by amending these statutes to allow tribes to opt-in to criminal

177. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (extending jurisdiction to include nonmember
Indians).
178. The Duro-fix, where Congress extended tribal criminal jurisdiction to
nonmember Indians, required nothing more than a simple amendment to
ICRA that changed the words “all members” to “all Indians.” See Act of Nov.
5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (amending
25 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1988) by reinstating until September 30, 1991 tribal criminal jurisdiction to “all Indians”). Congress made the change permanent the
next year in the Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301) (deleting the sunset provision).

1926

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1902

jurisdiction.179 In a challenge to the Duro-fix, the Supreme
Court affirmed the inherent, not delegated, authority of tribes
to prosecute and punish nonmember Indians.180 While beyond
the scope of this Note, this distinction is important for understanding the source of governmental power.181 Briefly, when
tribal authority is delegated, the source of the power is Congress, and the tribe merely exercises the narrow powers
granted by Congress.182 But when tribal authority is inherent,
the source of the power is the tribe and the tribe is not limited
to the fulfillment of a narrow congressional directive.183
Duro and Oliphant held that tribes do not have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and non-Indians, respectively. The Court relied on similar reasoning in both cases—
that prosecution by tribal governments disadvantages nonmember Indians and non-Indian defendants.184 Yet, with respect to tribal governments, nonmember Indians and nonIndians do not differ other than by race.185 Congress chose to
reinvest inherent tribal sovereignty with respect to nonmembers,186 and has the authority to implement an “Oliphant-fix.”187

179. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004). For a discussion of
using an opt-in provision for domestic violence, see Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 227–28
(2008).
180. Lara, 541 U.S. at 206.
181. See Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil
Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L. 471, 473 (2005) (discussing the difference between delegated
and inherent power and the sources of such power).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
185. Cf. G.D. Crawford, Looking Again at Tribal Jurisdiction: “Unwarranted Intrusions on Their Personal Liberty,” 76 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 430 (1993)
(explaining that the inclusion of nonmember Indians and the exclusion of nonIndians from “tribal jurisdiction [is] impermissibly based on race”). But see
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring preference for “Indians” was not a racial classification, but rather
a political class related to membership in a federally recognized tribe).
186. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (extending criminal jurisdiction of tribes to include “all Indians”).
187. Cf. N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 207–16 (2008)
(describing and critiquing draft legislation which would, inter alia, restore inherent tribal sovereignty and effectively overrule Oliphant and other recent
Supreme Court decisions limiting tribal sovereignty).
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Congress must consider certain factors in order to reinvest
inherent sovereignty with regard to criminal jurisdiction. First,
Oliphant prohibits tribes from exercising jurisdiction over nonIndians because of due process considerations.188 The U.S. Constitution requires that tribal courts extend all of the Bill of
Rights protections to non-Indian defendants189 because regardless of race or tribal affiliation, any defendant is a U.S. citizen,
and thus entitled to constitutional protection.190 Then again,
ICRA already imposes nearly all of those requirements on tribal courts,191 and with additional funding, it would be easy for
tribal courts to meet the single remaining requirement that defendants in a criminal trial have the opportunity to have legal
counsel provided by the court.192 The government agency administering the program would require tribes to provide full Bill
of Rights protections to criminal defendants. Congress has already shown that it recognizes the problems with criminal justice in Indian country and acknowledges the need to commit
funds,193 and could easily direct funding toward the provision of
such legal counsel. Second, ICRA limits the punishment that
188. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 (“[D]efendants [in tribal courts] are entitled to many of the due process protections accorded to defendants in federal
or state criminal proceedings. However, the guarantees are not identical.”).
189. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern that Congress can subject Lara, a U.S. citizen, “to
a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution”).
190. If the source of power for tribal courts is Congress, then the Constitution would bind any court exercising jurisdiction over defendants who are U.S.
citizens. Id. Whether the authority is a grant from Congress, a relaxation of
restrictions, or retained as a part of original tribal sovereignty exceeds the
scope of this Note.
191. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (discussing the rights which cannot be infringed
by tribal governments); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian
Prosecutors: Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187,
2199 (2000) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 . . . guarantees basic due
process protections to Indians tried in tribal courts; the same protections could
easily be extended to non-Indians.”).
192. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (holding
that under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right to an attorney,
and if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them), with 25
U.S.C. § 1302(6) (providing that defendants have the right to an attorney, but
this attorney must be provided at their “own expense”).
193. See Office of Violence Against Women, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant Program, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/
stop_grant_desc.htm [hereinafter STOP Violence] (last visited Apr. 12, 2009)
(“STOP formula grants and subgrants are intended for [among other purposes]
. . . [d]eveloping, enlarging, or strengthening programs addressing the needs
and circumstances of Indian tribes in dealing with violent crimes against
women, including the crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence.”).
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can be imposed by a tribal court,194 and Congress should amend
ICRA to allow tribes to dictate punishments that are commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.
B. THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS’ ROLE IN CREATING AN OPTIN PROGRAM
The BIA’s unique experience assessing the capacity of tribal legal systems under ICWA makes it the most appropriate
entity to administer an opt-in criminal jurisdiction program.195
To apply, a tribe would have to demonstrate that it is a federally recognized196 governing body that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers.197 Second, the application would
show that the tribal constitution authorizes such jurisdiction,198
and that the tribe has a procedure for clearly identifying persons who will be subject to the tribe’s jurisdiction.199 Third,
similar to the determination by the BIA in the re-assumption of
jurisdiction program under ICWA, the BIA would determine if
the tribe appears able to exercise jurisdiction over criminal
matters in a manner consistent with due process and the other
safeguards embodied in ICRA.200 Finally, the tribe would need
194. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (prohibiting tribes from imposing “cruel and
unusual punishment” on criminals).
195. In general, the BIA authorizes the creation of—and changes to—tribal
governments, constitutions, courts, and tribal codes. Id. § 476; see also id. § 2
(conferring power to Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 691 (1990). For example, the BIA, in cooperation with the Department of
Justice, oversees the Tribal Courts Assistance Program, which helps tribal
governments create and improve tribal judiciaries. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Programs: Tribal Courts Assistance Program (TCAP), http://www.ojp
.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/tribal.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009); see also Indian
Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
196. Federal recognition is necessary to establish tribal identity. COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3], at 138–39 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1) (2000).
198. Some tribal constitutions limit the scope of tribal jurisdiction to be
equivalent to the jurisdiction of the Court of Indian Offenses. See, e.g., MIAMI
TRIBE OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“[T]he judicial authority of the Tribe
shall be exercised by the Court of Indian Offenses.”); cf. Dussias, supra note
154, at 242 (noting that changes to some tribal codes and constitutions would
be necessary for federal recognition of tribal jurisdiction in civil cases involving Indians and non-Indians). The Courts of Indian Offenses have jurisdiction
over offenses by Indians committed in Indian country. 25 C.F.R. § 11.102(a)
(2008).
199. Id. at 240 (describing the procedural requirements under ICWA).
200. Id.
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to show that it has made incarceration arrangements for individuals who receive sentences of greater than one year.201
If the BIA approves the petition, then a procedure similar
to that of ICWA should be followed to ensure notification of all
affected parties. This includes publishing a notice in the Federal Register that clearly defines the territory now governed by
the tribe, and the sending of a copy of the notice to the tribe, attorney general, governor, and highest court of the state or
states affected by the change in jurisdiction.202 If the BIA does
not approve the petition, then it would notify the tribe of the
reasons for its disapproval, offer technical assistance to remedy
the defects, and allow the tribe to re-petition after correcting
the defects in the original plan.203
C. AN OPT-IN PROGRAM EFFECTUATES THE INTERESTS OF RAPE
VICTIMS AND TRIBES
To start, tribal jurisdiction will enhance the probability
that rape victims see justice, because tribal courts provide a
more appropriate forum than federal courts for disputes that
involve Indians or take place in Indian country. The courthouse
is closer,204 making it easier for victims to present witnesses
and evidence,205 and the definition and prosecution of the crime
by members of the community ensures a tailored response that
is far more likely to meet the unique needs of a Native American rape victim and the community.206 There are other efficiency gains as well: tribal law enforcement and tribal courts would
operate as a cohesive unit, making it less likely that cases get
misplaced in the transfer from tribal to federal government.207
201. Some tribes that lack jails make arrangements to pay state or county
facilities to accommodate defendants imprisoned by a tribal court. See Andrea
Smith, How the Criminal Justice System Uses Domestic Violence Programs
Against Native Women, WOMEN AND PRISON: A SITE FOR RESISTANCE, n.d.,
http://womenandprison.org/social-justice/andrea-smith.html. The Department
of Justice also makes grants available to tribes to plan and construct correctional facilities. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Programs: Correctional Facilities on Tribal Lands Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/tribal_
correction.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
202. Dussias, supra note 154, at 240 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 13.14(a)(3), (b)
(1986)).
203. Id. at 240–41 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 13.14(c), (d), 13.16 (1986)).
204. Id. at 233.
205. Id.
206. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1302.
207. Id. (“The criminal justice system cannot function when its two main
components—police and prosecutors—work in isolation.”).
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Furthermore, such an approach does not force Native American
women to choose between supporting tribal sovereignty and
seeking prosecution,208 and is likely to have broad support
within the Native American community.209
In particular, an opt-in program would be ideal because
tribes differ in their ability and willingness to assume broader
jurisdiction.210 The current system often does not provide Native American rape victims with justice and may encourage
self-help remedies from the community.211 Thus, where the tribal government is willing and able to assume jurisdiction and
seek justice on the victim’s behalf, the tribe should do so. Before Oliphant, many tribes extended criminal jurisdiction to
non-Indians, and it is likely that they will wish to do so again if
given the opportunity.212
On the contrary, jurisdiction should not be transferred to
tribal governments that cannot or will not meet certain minimum requirements. Tribes that are unwilling to exercise jurisdiction would probably not bother with the lengthy application
process, and an opt-in program would carefully screen tribes for
the ability to carry out significant law-enforcement responsibilities. Yet an opt-in program leaves the opportunity available to
tribes that cannot currently afford to develop a judiciary but
may be able to in the future.213
Lastly, allowing tribal jurisdiction would benefit both the
federal government and tribal governments. Tribal governments would benefit from improved tribal courts, because broadened jurisdiction is “integral to the internal legitimacy of tribal legal systems and the extent to which tribal communities
accept them as valid institutions,”214 and benefits victims of all
crimes committed by non-Indians on the reservation by establishing an alternate forum for prosecution.215 Also, some argue
that transferring jurisdiction over important matters preserves
208. Id.
209. For example, the National Congress of American Indians supports increases in tribal sentencing authority, prosecutorial authority, and federal
support to enhance tribes’ response to violence against Native American women. Norrell, supra note 16.
210. Dussias, supra note 154, at 237.
211. Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2201.
212. Radon, supra note 25, at 1292.
213. See id. at 1311.
214. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1109–14 (2005).
215. See Radon, supra note 25, at 1303.
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institutional incentives for tribal judges to do their jobs well,216
and that increased tribal jurisdiction is likely to enhance the
day-to-day functioning of the tribal judicial system.217 Further,
self-determination has had, and under an opt-in program will
most likely continue to have, the effect of improving the accountability of tribal officials to members.218 Further, assumption of jurisdiction over cases and responsibility for prosecution
by tribes would likely reduce reliance on federal and state resources. Finally, allowing some tribes to prosecute major crimes
frees federal prosecutors and courts to proceed more efficiently
with the types of cases with which they are most competent.219
D. OBSTACLES TO CREATING AN OPT-IN PROGRAM FOR
ASSUMING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
For this Note, the primary concern with regard to an opt-in
program for criminal jurisdiction is whether such a solution
would meet the needs of Native American rape victims. Some
critics might voice concern that tribes would use Tribal Peacemaking (TPM) inappropriately.220 As discussed above, however,
tribes generally do not use TPM where the defendant is not a
member, and the vast majority of reported perpetrators are
non-Indians. Additionally, a victim’s advocate might argue that
a tribal court might lack the resources or the willpower to train
judges, prosecutors, police, and staff to deal with emotionally
fragile sexual assault victims. The proposed opt-in program accounts for such a possibility by requiring the BIA to set standards and provide funding as part of its role in determining
which tribal courts it will allow to assume criminal jurisdiction.
The general public’s main concerns would likely relate to
whether defendants would receive due process in tribal courts
and whether tribal courts would be likely to exercise jurisdiction so as not to create a public safety hazard off the reserva216. Berger, supra note 214, at 1052, 1115–18 (“[I]nstitutional pride leads
the judges to carefully scrutinize the facts, law, and morality of the issues before them to fulfill this institutional role and resist temptations to rule based
on the status of the parties or political pressure.”).
217. See id. at 1119–20 (arguing that tribal courts with broader judicial experience function better than tribal courts that deal with more limited issues).
218. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 832 (citation
omitted).
219. Washburn, American Indians, supra note 33, at 729–30 (arguing that
the physical and cultural distances between tribal communities and federal
prosecutors undermine the institutional competence of the latter).
220. Bradford, supra note 116, at 584 –85.
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tion. Due process concerns probably depend more on the public’s perception of unfairness (despite the sophistication of
many tribal courts) than on any proof that tribal courts are
likely to be unfair to non-Indian defendants.221 ICRA closely resembles the Bill of Rights, with the exception of the right to
free legal counsel,222 and some courts even provide greater protections than the Bill of Rights.223 Some tribes require jurors to
be tribal members—but other tribes, like the Navajo, select jurors from a jury pool that reflects a cross-section of the community.224 Some tribes do implement modes of dispute resolution
and tribal laws that differ from state and federal laws,225 but
most tribal courts chose to base their codes and judicial systems on the BIA code and courts,226 and the supremacy of state
and federal laws in district courts has resulted in much confluence between the federal and tribal legal systems.227 Ultimately, both the theory and the practice of Indian dispute resolution
and the TPM concept indicate that it cannot successfully be applied to defendants who are not members of the community,
and thus is not applied to them.228 Therefore, allowing a tribe
to prosecute a non-resident (whether non-Indian or a nonmember Indian) should not differ from allowing a state to prosecute a citizen of another state for violations of its own laws.229
Indeed, as one scholar points out, the chances of a rogue tribal
221. Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2200. One scholar surveyed ten cases
involving ICRA interpretation and found “no indication that tribal courts have
succumbed to the temptation to favor the insider at the expense of outsiders.”
Mark Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 479, 578 (2000).
222. Radon, supra note 25, at 1306–08. Congress has already shown its willingness to provide additional funding to tribal courts. Indian Tribal Justice
Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat.
2778 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). Tribes that qualified for an
opt-in program could automatically receive additional funding for defense
counsel on an as-needed basis. Indeed, tribes that have benefited from tourism
and gambling may not need federal assistance at all.
223. For example, at least one tribe grants a jury trial for all crimes, regardless of severity. Radon, supra note 25, at 1308.
224. Burleson, supra note 66, at 215–16.
225. For instance, traditional Native legal systems emphasize restoration
of the offender and his (or her) reintegration into the community. Bradford,
supra note 116, at 565.
226. Dussias, supra note 154, at 225–26.
227. Bradford, supra note 116, at 575.
228. See id. at 578–79.
229. See Cunningham, supra note 191, at 2200–01.
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court making decisions in bad faith are similar to the chances
of rogue state courts doing the same.230
An independent judiciary and the availability of appellate
review would further allay many concerns about rogue tribal
courts. Independent judicial review is important to the protection of individual rights,231 but “the ability of tribal councils to
remove judges limits the independence of tribal courts.”232 The
BIA could play a key role in determining whether a tribe’s past
functioning indicates that it has independently functioning
courts. Appellate review, vested in either a federal court or a
specialized tribal appellate court, would further protect individuals’ freedom against arbitrary or abusive actions by tribal
governments.233 Although federal appellate review could intrude on tribal sovereignty by imposing federal laws on tribal
decisions or by creating the perception that tribal courts are
“inferior,”234 tribal appellate review in tribal courts—with no
recourse to the federal judicial system—may feed the paranoia.
In contrast, appellate review in the federal courts would not require the creation or funding of any additional courts and
would alleviate concerns in the non-Indian community of discrimination against outsiders.
Lack of political support to create such a program is also a
valid concern. The Supreme Court has affirmed that tribes
have inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians—but Oliphant
and Lara both make it clear that for tribes to exercise such jurisdiction, Congress must reinvest tribal jurisdiction,235 as it
has done through programs such as the “Re-assumption of Jurisdiction” for the adoption of Indian children and “Treatment

230. See Berger, supra note 214, at 1096–97.
231. See Burleson, supra note 66, at 215.
232. Id. (citing O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5).
233. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13
(1949) (“[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow . . . officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected.”).
234. Radon, supra note 25, at 1309.
235. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution
authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal
authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
698 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978)
(holding that ICRA and the prevalence of crime on reservations are “considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally
be authorized to try non-Indians”).
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as State” under federal environmental laws.236 Congress has
recognized both the need to protect Native American women
from sexual assault237 and the need for strong tribal governments to counteract the high levels of crime in Indian country.238 For example, a recent Senate bill proposed that the Homeland Security Act be amended to recognize the inherent
sovereignty of tribes with regard to law enforcement and criminal matters.239 Although this specific bill has not yet passed,
recent legislative history with regard to criminal justice and
sexual assault suggest that Congress would support an opt-in
solution.240
On the whole, the greatest obstacle to tribal jurisdiction
may not lie in the structure of tribal governments or their adherence to Anglo-American ideals, but simply in the lack of
consistent funding and clear direction from Congress. The U.S.
Civil Rights Commission conducted a study on tribal implementation of ICRA and found that “while there [are] problems
in tribal courts, they [are] primarily due to insufficient funds
and the problems of any new court system in establishing its
role and the scope of its authority.”241 As with other obstacles
discussed in this section, Congress can remedy the lack of fund236. See Rodgers, supra note 152, at 818–19; Pauline Turner Strong, What
Is an Indian Family? The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Renascence of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 AM. STUD. 205, 224 (2005).
237. See, e.g., STOP Violence, supra note 193.
238. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of
2000 §§ 2–3, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778, 2778–79 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 3651–53, 3661–66 & 3681) (providing funding for tribal governments
to strengthen tribal justice systems); Cawley, supra note 14, at 434 –35.
239. Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of
2002, S. 578, 108th Cong. (2003).
240. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong.
(2008) (requiring federal authorities to file declination reports when they
refuse a prosecution and allowing tribes the option to increase maximum sentences to three years as long as counsel is provided to defendants); 154 CONG.
REC. S7158 (daily ed. July 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (“One of the
primary causes for violent crime is the disjointed system of justice in Indian
country that is broken at its core. The current system limits the authority of
Tribes to fight crime, and requires tribal communities to rely completely on
the United States to investigate and prosecute violent crimes occurring on reservations.”); S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., CONCEPT PAPER FOR
AN INDIAN COUNTRY CRIME BILL 15, available at http://www.indian.senate
.gov/public/_files/IndianCrimeBillCONCEPTPAPER.pdf (recommending a pilot project acknowledging the inherent authority of tribes over any person who
commits sexual assault on a reservation).
241. Berger, supra note 214, at 1096 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 29–57 (1991)).
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ing through its exercise of plenary power to establish an opt-in
program.
III. LAW AND POLICY BOTH INDICATE THAT TRIBES
SHOULD HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A strong legal and policy basis exists for overturning Oliphant. First, the evidence supporting the finding of implicit divestment in Oliphant, on which Duro relied for its reasoning, is
not particularly strong.242 In both Oliphant and Duro, the Supreme Court held that tribal criminal jurisdiction had been impliedly divested by tribes’ dependent status,243 and if exercised,
such jurisdiction would constitute an “unwarranted intrusion[]
on [defendants’] personal liberty.”244
In analyzing the Choctaw Treaty in Oliphant, the Court
disregarded a central principle of Indian law: that courts
should construe treaties as the tribes would have understood
them.245 In interpreting text from the treaty that stated that
“the tribe is guaranteed jurisdiction and government of all the
persons and property that may be within their limits,”246 the
Choctaw could reasonably have understood this provision to
mean that they would have jurisdiction over any persons who
entered their territory, Indian or otherwise.247 Similarly, the
Court relied on a lone 1878 district court opinion, which has
garnered little clear support from the federal government.248
The Court may also have misinterpreted evidence of congressional intent. For example, it construed the General
Crimes Act as evidence of Congress’s intent to remove jurisdic-

242. Radon, supra note 25, at 1290–93.
243. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 207–08 (1978).
244. Duro, 495 U.S. at 692 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210).
245. Peter C. Monson, Casenote, United States v. Washington (Phase II):
The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L. 469, 476 n.38
(1982) (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note
196, § 2.02 (describing the canons of construction of federal Indian law).
246. Radon, supra note 25, at 1291 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247. See id. (“If Congress wanted to ensure that tribes would not have the
power to try non-Indians, it ‘could have expressed that intent more clearly
than it did in the 1830 treaty.’”) (quoting Peter Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: The Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J.
CONTEMP. L. 391, 412 (1993)).
248. See id.
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tion from tribes;249 however, history indicates that the government’s only intent was to assure that a forum existed to protect
Indians from “the lawless part of our frontier inhabitants”250 in
the absence of tribal courts, which is no longer the case. Likewise, the Court read the 1834 Western Territory bill251 as Congress’s careful attempt to avoid giving criminal jurisdiction to
tribes,252 but observed only in a footnote that the bill did not
pass because it lacked support.253 Ultimately, the Court’s decision rested on nothing more than implication. Courts generally
avoid extending Congress’s plenary power over tribes by implication unless the matter relates closely to a federal statute.254
Where the evidence was ambiguous, as here, the Supreme
Court should have followed the presumption against implied
divestment laid out by precedent.
Furthermore, the Oliphant holding should not apply to all
tribes. For example, at least one treaty explicitly provided that
a United States citizen settling on Indian land “shall forfeit the
protection of the United States, and the Cherokees may punish
him or not, as they please.”255 Further support comes from an
1834 House Report, which explicitly notes that “we cannot, consistently with the provisions of some [of] our treaties, and of
the territorial act, extend our criminal laws to offences committed by or against Indians, of which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction.”256 Each tribe negotiated its own treaty with the
United States, and many were never expressly abrogated; the
federal government simply stopped enforcing them.257 Indeed,
the treaties that provided for criminal jurisdiction were most
similar to the type of treaty providing extraterritorial jurisdiction—the exercise of jurisdiction outside a sovereign’s territory.258 Courts have recognized the transfer of power described in
249. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 (interpreting the General Crimes Act).
250. See, e.g., George Washington, Seventh Annual Address, 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1908, 182, 185
(James D. Richardson ed., 1909).
251. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 36 (1834).
252. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202.
253. Id. at 202 n.13 (noting Congress’s failure to pass the bill even after
several revisions and resubmissions).
254. Crawford, supra note 185, at 414. For example, the Major Crimes Act
includes lesser-included offenses. Id.
255. Treaty at Holston art. VIII, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, 40.
256. H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 13 (1834).
257. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 794.
258. See Crawford, supra note 185, at 416–17.
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such treaties as a grant of power from the independent sovereign to the United States,259 not an implicit divestment of the
foreign country’s inherent authority. Thus, the lack of a treaty
provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to the United States
may mean that some tribes still retain such inherent jurisdiction, regardless of specific treaty provisions, because those treaties did not explicitly transfer power from tribes to the United
States.260
Oliphant and Duro both rested on the same “personal liberty” and “implicit divestment” arguments.261 Since Congress
rejected the jurisdictional distinction between member and
nonmember Indians in Duro,262 and nothing other than race263
distinguishes nonmember Indians from non-Indians from the
perspective of a tribal court,264 it logically follows that the Supreme Court should eliminate the distinction between Indians
and non-Indians. Indeed, factors such as government participation, membership, or citizenship are usually considered only
with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction while tribal governments here seek only to extend only their territorial jurisdiction.265
259. See id. The reasoning behind these treaties was that courts in some
non-Christian (mostly Muslim and Far Eastern) countries were so inferior
that U.S. citizens could not possibly obtain justice there due to bias, religious
or otherwise. See id.
260. Id. at 408 n.54 (“Since treaties represent grants of power from tribes,
failure of tribes to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government
meant that tribes retained the jurisdiction.”).
261. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686, 692–93 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208, 210 (1978).
262. Duro, 495 U.S. at 695–96 (arguing that nonmembers bear more resemblance to non-Indians with regard to their status on the reservation).
263. Native Americans may constitute either a political group, Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (“The [employment] preference, as applied,
is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the
BIA in a unique fashion.”) or a racial group, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
(2000) (distinguishing Morton v. Mancari and striking down Hawaii’s requirement that voters for trustees of indigenous trusts be descended from
those who inhabited the Islands prior to 1778 as race based and thus unconstitutional). From the perspective of a tribal court, however, neither a non-Indian
nor a nonmember Indian belongs to the tribe.
264. Gould, supra note 98, at 70 n.77 (citation omitted). But see Means v.
Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 931–35 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that
“Means’s equal protection argument has real force” but concluding that the
1990 amendments to ICRA define nonmember Indians on the basis of political
affiliation, not race).
265. Crawford, supra note 185, at 432.
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Finally, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by federal and
state governments in Indian country does not rest on any constitutional authority.266 The Indian Commerce Clause is insufficient to justify the plenary power on which the Oliphant
Court rests its finding that tribes are “domestic dependent nations.”267 Even if Congress has the power to regulate commerce
with tribes, its authority should not extend to the power to regulate the tribes themselves.268 Further, weakness and helplessness are insufficient to justify plenary power over nations—just as the federal government does not have plenary
power over Ethiopia, however frail and dependent it might
be.269 This is especially true in the era of self-determination,
when even the Oliphant Court of 1978 recognized that many
tribes are neither weak nor helpless270 nor in need of “fixed
laws [and] . . . competent tribunals of justice.”271
The Supreme Court has, under certain circumstances, recognized tribal courts as the appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes that affect the important personal
or property interests of either an Indian or a non-Indian.272
Sexual assault clearly affects “an important personal interest”
of the rape victim. Even in Oliphant, dissenting Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Burger argued that “[I]n the absence of
affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute . . . Indian tribes
enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the

266. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (arguing that “it
would be a very strained construction of [the Indian Commerce] clause” to
enact laws to punish common-law crimes without any reference to trade and
intercourse).
267. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 –15 (2004) (Thomas, J.
concurring) (asserting that the Constitution does not grant Congress plenary
power to define tribal sovereignty). See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Against
Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 (2004) (discrediting suggested
bases for Congress’s plenary power over tribes, including the Treaty Clause,
the Property Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause).
268. Prakash, supra note 267, at 1081.
269. Id. at 1103–04.
270. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212–13 (1978)
(“[S]ome Indian tribal court systems have become increasingly sophisticated
and resemble in many respects their state counterparts.”).
271. Id. at 210.
272. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of
both Indians and non-Indians.”).
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right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against
tribal law within the reservation.”273
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the current system
does not meet the needs of Native American rape victims or the
victims of any other violent crimes committed on reservations.
The determination of whether the accused is an “Indian,” of
whether a piece of land falls within the definition of “Indian
land,” and ultimately, whether tribal, state, or federal law enforcement should prosecute the sexual assault can result in
considerable dispute in practice, thwarting a Native American
woman’s access to justice.274 Similarly, the difficulty of determining whether federal, state, or tribal laws apply275 complicates the tribe’s ability to arrest and prosecute where the relevant federal or state prosecutor chooses not to do so. The
resulting confusion contributes to the lack of prosecution of
rapes committed against Native American women.276 The current administration of criminal justice in Indian country is also
inconsistent with self-determination policy277 and the extent to
which tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Both law and policy suggest that Congress should allow tribes
to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed against Native
Americans and on the reservation.

273. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)) (agreeing
with the lower court that the “power to preserve order on the reservation . . . is
a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed”).
274. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 27–28; Thorington, supra note 49, at
977 (listing factors to consider in the determination of a tribe’s jurisdiction:
“whether the parties are Indian or non-Indian, tribal members or nonmember
Indians; whether the incident occurred in Indian country . . . whether the
crime is a ‘major crime’; and whether the tribe is subject to federal legislation
limiting the tribes’ jurisdiction”).
275. Although many tribes have laws and ordinances that govern the punishment of sexual violence, federal courts prosecuting a crime by or against
an Indian according to the General Crimes Act still apply the law “in the same
manner as . . . within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”
18 U.S.C. § 3242 (2006). Even on Indian land, if a non-Indian commits a crime
or is the victim of a crime, federal law applies except where jurisdiction has
been ceded to the state. Blumenthal, supra note 29.
276. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 9, at 8.
277. For an overview of federal Indian policy in the last fifty years, popularly known as “self-determination,” see COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 196,
§ 1.07.
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CONCLUSION
Even a glance at the legal system in Indian country reveals
a certain irony. Tribes can protect their members from the
long-term effects of water pollution but cannot provide any protection against direct, imminent threats such as sexual assault.
Although the Supreme Court finds it unfair to subject Indians
to federal criminal jurisdiction278 and non-Indians to tribal
criminal jurisdiction,279 the Major Crimes Act ensures that federal courts retain jurisdiction over Indians but not vice versa.280
But irony provides little comfort to a Native American woman
who has suffered sexual assault and all of its collateral consequences. If the offender is Native American, then she must balance her own desire for reparation or punishment against those
of her tribal community. If the offender is non-Indian, then her
perpetrator is likely to go unpunished, and nothing stops him
from committing the same offense again.
The statutes and cases that form the basis of modern criminal jurisdiction are inconsistent and do not reflect modern federal Indian policy. Tribal governments have demonstrated the
capacity and desire to undertake certain types of civil regulatory authority,281 and many systems include features similar to
the Anglo-American system.282 Providing tribes with the option
to opt in to criminal jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional
confusion, provide more culturally relevant justice, respect tribal sovereignty, and help tribal governments achieve the goal
of self-determination set by Congress and the executive branch.
Ultimately, tribes could experiment according to the preferences and needs of their members in the same way that states
serve as laboratories for the development of laws.283 Although
278. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (arguing that it would be
unfair to subject Indians to alien federal courts because such courts try Indians “according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect
conception”).
279. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (arguing that non-Indian citizens should be “protected by the United States from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty” by tribal courts).
280. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169, at 147–48.
281. For example, tribes have successfully implemented Treatment-asState provisions of the Clean Water Act, Rodgers, supra note 152, at 818–19,
and reassumption of jurisdiction provisions of ICWA. See Strong, supra note
236, at 224.
282. Dussias, supra note 154, at 233–34 (noting that tribal laws generally
are not substantially different from Anglo-American laws, and procedures are
generally conducted in English).
283. O’Connor, supra note 113, at 5–6.
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Oliphant and Duro articulate important constitutional concerns
about fairness to non-Indians, readily achievable procedural
adjustments would allow individual tribal governments to meet
due process requirements and receive congressional approval to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians
alike. An opt-in program that transfers criminal jurisdiction to
tribes that are ready and willing addresses the concerns expressed by the Court and brings justice to victims of rape.

